In-Hair-Ent Rights and Tonsorial Tutelage by Moore, James D.
Montana Law Review
Volume 32
Issue 2 Summer 1971 Article 7
7-1-1971
In-Hair-Ent Rights and Tonsorial Tutelage
James D. Moore
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana Law
Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
James D. Moore, In-Hair-Ent Rights and Tonsorial Tutelage, 32 Mont. L. Rev. (1971).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol32/iss2/7
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
IN-HAIR-ENT RIGHTS AND TONSORIAL TUTELAGE
INTRODUCTION
May the state, through its public schools, promulgate and enforce
regulations whereby an individual may be denied an education solely
because of the length of his hair? This question, perhaps representing
a test to the extremes of guarenteed personal rights, has found its way
into American courtroom with increasing frequency. It has not been
decided by the Supreme Court, and has received comment from but
one Supreme Court Justice.'
The state and federal courts confronting this question have thus
far applied divergent approaches and have induced divergent outcomes.
There is no agreement as to whether the right of an individual to
determine his hair style is constitutionally protected. Where such a
right is assumed, or decided in the affirmative, there is no agreement
as to where in the Constitution that right is preserved, whether it is
fundamental, or whether, and under what circumstances, the state, through
its schools, may restrict it.
The outcome in these cases, although literally restricted to the per-
sonal grooming-school regulation question, bears directly upon the status
and scope of other personal rights, as translated through the special
environment of the school. It will be the purpose of this article to
•~  ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1 U bl' LII I ILU UUI 1 11 llu lb -Pi-us Cases
exa1m.;c and compare the opinions handed down inr th e fifty-pu ae
which have reached the courts to date.
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DETERMINE
ONE'S HAIR STYLE.
In 1879 the sheriff for the city and county of San Francisco, acting
under an 1876 ordinance,2 improvidently clipped off the queue of one
Ho Ali Kow, who had been sentenced to six months in jail for failure
to pay a fine assessed against him for the commission of a misdemeanor.
Ho brought an action against the sheriff3 alleging that the sheriff had
no right to cut his hair, that it constituted a cruel and unusual punishment,
and that the ordinance, as applied to him, violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States. The Court upheld Ho's contentions, noting particularly that
the absence of a queue among those of Chinese ancestry was a sign
of contempt and disgrace among his peers, and that the enforcement
'Justice Douglas, dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Ferrell v. Dallas Inde-
pendent School District, 393 U.S. 856 (1968), stated at 856: "It comes as a surprise
that in a country where the States are restrained by an Equal Protection Clause, a
person can be denied education in a public school because of the length of his hair.''
2The ordinance provided that upon arrival at the jail, the hair of all prisoners should
be clipped to a uniform length of one inch. Although applicable to all inmates, on its
face, the ordinance had been drafted and enforced with an eye for the Chinese, who
allegedly needed additional impetus before they would pay their fines.
3Ho Ha Kow v. Nunan, 12 F. Cas. 252 (D. Cal. 1879).
[Vol. 32
1
Moore: In-Hair-Ent Rights and Tonsorial Tutelage
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1971
NOTES
of the ordinance against Ho therefore constituted a cruel and unusual
punishment.4
This case is the first in which the right to retain one's hair was
given overt recognition by an American Court. Grooming cases, as
with the geat majority of personal liberty cases, are actually of a
more recent vintage. Most have arisen within the past decade, over
ninety percent of them having found the courts within the last three
years. 5 Of these recent cases, five either did not reach or did not see
fit to discuss the constitutional issue.6 Approximately one-third of the
cases assumed arguendo the existence of the right, without expressly
deciding thereupon.7 In only three cases did the court meet and flatly
reject the contention that hair length and style might be constitution-
ally protected.8 In contrast, twenty-three recognized the right to deter-
'Id. at 255. It is noteworthy that this facet of the opinion, recognizing the special
significance of hair as a symbol among certain groups, and appearing to give weight
to peer group opinion, may have been applicable to the cases which follow, although
cited by none.
5The source which sparked the long-hair look among American youth was probably the
English 'rock" group, the Beatles. They appeared on the American scene in 1963-64,
at a time when social and political disenchantment was beginning to increase among
young people. The Beatles offered not only highly innovative music, but a new physi-
cal identity with which to consummate a break with the rejected value hierarchy.
Independently, the social and political frustration manifested itself through other
channels. Some retreated into the pensive solitude of marijuana and related drugs.
Some exploded into the violent reaction observed through racial riots and anti-war
demonstrations. Others became involved in and worked through the system.
From outside this arena of activity, unfortunately, the new violence (physical re-
jection), the new rise in drug use (mental rejection), and the physical appearance
of independence offered by long hair became virtually synonymous. Long hair except
where predominant early in the 60 's, became the symbol of a present use of drugs
and an impending use of violence. Consequently, and in reaction thereto, it became
vogue' in the schools to put restrictions upon hair length.
GGfell v. Rickelman, 313 F. Supp. 364 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Alexander v. Thompson, 313
F. Supp. 1390 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Doe v. Hacker, 316 F. Supp. 1144 (D. New Hamp-
shire 1970); Giangreco v. Center High School District, 313 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Mo.
1969); and Leonard v. School Committee of Attelboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d
468 (1965).
By constitutional issue is meant whether there exists, in its pure state, a constitu-
tionally protected right to wear one's hair in the style of one's choice. This issue
should no be confused with the power of the state, through its schools, to restrict
and regulate hair styles among students, although the justification required to sus-
tain such regulations may be directly conditioned upon whether the court answers
the former issue in the affirmative.
7jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th ir. 1970); King v. Saddleback Junior College
District, 425 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1970); Wood v. Almo Heights Independent School
District, 308 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex. 1970); Pritchard v. Spring Branch Independent
School District, 308 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Schwartz v. Galveston Inde-
pendent School District, 309 F. Supp. 1034 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Lovelace v. Leechburg
Area School District, 310 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Chistmas v. El Reno Board
of Education, 313 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Okla. 1960); Livingston v. Swanquist, 314
F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Bannister v. Paradis, 316 F. Supp. 185 (D. N.H. 1970);
Bishop v. Colaw, 316 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Mo. 1970); Black v. Cothern, 316 F. Supp.
468 (D. Neb. 1970); Carter v. Hodges, 317 F. Supp. 89 (W.D. Ark. 1970); Crews
v. Clones, 303 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1969); Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94
(N.D. Ill. 1969) ; Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, 392 F.2d 697 (5th
Cir. 1968); and Zachry v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ala. 1967).
8Cordova v. Chonko, 315 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Stevenson v. Wheeler County
Board of Education, 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969); and Davis v. Firment, 269
F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967).
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mine one's hair length and style as contained within the constitutional
guarantees.9
Among the latter group, those which found the right protected, the
court in Breen v. Kahlt° was most adament. In that case the plaintiff,
an eleventh grade student, was expelled because his hair violated the
high school grooming regulation." The court, after noting that petition-
er's hair style was not obscene, as suggested by the defendant school
administrators, stated that the wearing of one's hair at a certain length
might be considered a form of expression in which speech and non-
speech elements are combined, and to which the U.S. v. O'Brien test 12
was applicable. The court, however, found it unnecessary to determine
whether hair style was expression within the purview of the First Amend-
ment. It compared the difficulty in ascertaining the specific guaranty
which embraced this right to the difficulty encountered in Griswold v.
Connecticut,13 but indicated that the right to present one's self physically
to the world as one pleases is a highly protected interest which the
state must not impair without first bearing "a substantial burden of
justification.' '14 The Court also decribed the value as "implicit within
the concept of ordered liberty,' " the justification of which required
a compelling state interest.
9Griffin v. Tatum, 425 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1970); Crossen v. Fatsi, 309 F. Supp. 114
(D. Conn. 1970); Cash v. Hoch, 309 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Wis. 1970); Reichenberg v.
Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb. 1970); Farrell v. Smith, 310 F. Supp. 732 (D.
Maine 1970); Dunham v. Pulsifier, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Ver. 1970); Corley v.
Daubauer, 312 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Ark. 1970); Elko v. McCarey, 315 F. Supp. 886
(E.D. Pa. 1970); Boyle v. Scapple, 38 U.S.L.W. 2614, . F. Supp .... (D-Ore. 1970);
Whitsell v. Pampas Independent School District, 316 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Tex. 1970);
Breen v. Kahl, 296 F. Supp. 702 (W.D. Wis. 1969); Griffin v. Tatum, 300 F. Supp.
60 (M.D. Ala. 1969); Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969); Richards
v. Thurston, 304 F. Supp. 449 (D. Mass. 1969); Olff v. East Side Union High School
District, 305 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Cal. 1969); Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706
(D. Minn. 1969); Calbillo v. San Jacinto Junior College, 305 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Tex.
1969); Brick v. Board of Education, 305 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Colo. 1969); Yoo v.
Moynihan, 28 Conn. Supp. 375, 262 A.2d 814 (1969); Meyers v. Arcata Union High
School District, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1969); Akin v. Board of Education of Riverside
Unified School District, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1968); and Finot v. Pasadena City Board
of Education, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967).
"Breen v. Kahl, supra note 9.
Hld. at 703. The grooming regulation of the Williams Bay High School Dress Code,
involved therein, provided: "Hair should be washed, combed, and worn so it does
not hang below the collar line in back, over the ears on the side, and must be above
the eyebrows. Boys should be clean shaven.''
"U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). Where a government regulation prohibits
conduct containing both speech and nonspeech elements, the regulation can be sus-
tained only if (1) promulgation of the regulation was within the constitutional power
of the government, (2) the governmental interest subserved by the regulation is sub-
stantial or important, (3) the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech,
and (4) the incidental restriction on speech is no greater than is essential.
'sGriswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The "right" which confronted the
court in that case was that of a husband and wife, within the privacy of their home,
to discuss and use contraceptives.
"Breen v. Kahl, supra note 9 at 706. The quoted passage reappears frequently within
the framework of these cases.
nPalko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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In Griffin v. Tatum,16 the Court noted the analysis in Breen, and
concluded:
Although there is disagreement over the proper analytical frame-
work, there can be little doubt that the Constitution protects the
freedom to determine one's own hair style and otherwise govern
one's personal appearance .... In short, the freedom here protected
is the right to some breathing space for the individual into which
the government may not intrude without carrying a substantial
burden of justification.
Both Breen and Griffin, although unclear as to the nature and source
of the right to govern one's hair style, were cited by Judge Wyzanski
in Richards v. Thurston.1 8 Pointing out that hair was "one of the most
visible examples of personality," and that petitioner's 'Beatle cut' was
14... in a tidy style that Albert Einstein rarely displayed," Wyzanski
simply paraphrased petitioner's right as "his liberty to express in his
own way his preference as to whatever hair style comports with his per-
sonality and his own search for identity.'"
19
It is doubtful that hair length can be protected solely on grounds that
it constitutes expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment. While
there has been substantial dicta favorable to such a position, akin to that
found in Breen, noted above, most courts, like that in Breen, either found
it unnecessary to reach such a contention, or felt that hair was not suffi-
ciently expressive to entitle it to First Amendment protection. In only
two cases was the "right to self-expression in the styling of one's hair"
held to be a First Amendment right.20 Other courts squarely meeting this
argument flatly rejected it, generally reasoning that the records were de-
void of any particular ideological, philosophical, political, or sociological
ideas which the various petitioners might have expressed by their hair
length.21
"Griffin v. Tatum, supra note 9. This case was appealed, and although affirmed, was
toned down substantially. See 425 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1970).
"Id. at 62. Again, the Court found it unnecessary to reach or decide the petitioner's
First Amendment claim. As to the right to be left alone, to "breathing space", it
appears to find its nebulous roots in Griswold, supra note 13.
'Richards v. Thurston, supra note 9.
'"Id. at 452, 453.
'Yoo v. Moynihan, supra note 9; Westley v. Rossi, supra note 9.
'Jackson v. Dorrier, supra note 7 Pritchard v. Spring Branch Independent School
District, supra note 7; Davis v. Firment, supra note 8; Brick v. Board of Education,
supra note 9; Orossen v. Fatis, supra note 9; Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School
District, supra note 7.
This writer has divided feelings about the position as taken by these courts. It is
clear that an outer limit must be imposed upon the term "speech", as found in the
First Amendment. It is also clear that our founding fathers did not intend, nor even
contemplate, that the term ''speech'' might encompass hair length or style.
The term '' speech' ', however, has been construed to mean ''expression' ', and thus
to include such conduct as burning a selective service card, U.S. v. O'Brien, supra
note 12; wearing black armbands, Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503
(1969); soliciting legal causes, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); in some
cases, picketing, Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968),; saluting the flag, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943); and, rather ironically, even pure silence, Brown v. Louisiana, 383
U.S. 131 (1966).
1971]
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Whether Griswold v. Connecticut" created a place for such a right
as that involved in the hair cases is likewise a tenuous proposition, largely
because of the absence of a majority opinion in the Griswold decision.
Griswold was similar to the hair cases in that it dealt with another Con-
stitutionally unnamed right-the right to discuss and use contraceptives
within the privacy of one's home. The Supreme Court recognized the
right to be fundamental, but could not agree upon where, within the frame-
work of the constitution, the right was guaranteed. Justice Douglas's
plurality opinion suggested the right to be a "penumbral right" of the
First Amendment, while Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion opted for
the Ninth Amendment. 23
Understandably, Griswold has received substantial mention in the
hair cases. Faced with finding a place for this unarticulated but funda-
mental personal right, the court in Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School Dis-
Irict 2' cryptically summed up the views of many courts:
We believe there is not [a constitutional right to determine one's
own hair sytle] unless it can be derived [like contraception and
privacy, citing Griswold] by the process of cerebral parthenogenisis
from primeval darkness and a vague constitutional continuum with-
out form and void. The task should not be formed by a court of
first instance. We concede that speculation regarding the nature
and the mystery of the Ninth Amendment rights is an attractive area
for philosophic ratiocination.
Only three cases have rejected the Griswold approach. The Court in
Davis v. Firmeni-- noted the absence Of a majority opifliob in Griswold,
and stated that even had there been one, the free choice in grooming was
not a fundamental right.26 The Court in King v. Saddleback Junior College
District2 7 discussed the Griswold contention, but decided that "since the
factual existence of this right [to be left alone, the First Amendment
penumbral right of privacy] itself is in doubt at this point in the pro-
ceeding, we do not think plaintiff's case is entitled to the per set status
The requirement that a particular sociological, political, or philosophical idea be
expressed by hair length would appear to go beyond the test applied in the above
cases, if under this requirement he who asserts the right must show that what is
being expressed is susceptible to precise articulation. Perhaps otherwise stated, if
conduct, to be entitled to First Amendment protections, must be intended as a direct
substitute for verbal expression, there still remains the question, "expression of
what ?"
In the midst of this First Amendment soul-searching comes hair. For some it is
a single factor in personality, that often unconscious way we present ourselves to
the world. For others, as it was for our forefathers, who donned silver wigs as a
symbol, albeit vague, of wisdom and experience, it is even more.
'Griswold, supra note 13.
'The Ninth Amendment provides: "The ennumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
'Lovelace, supra note 7.
nDavis v. Firment, supra note 7.
"Davis v. Firment stands alone in this holding.
'King v. Saddleback Junior College District, supra note 7.
[Vol. 32
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guaranteed by the Constitution28 The court in Miller v. Gillis,9 simply
rejected the contention without discussion.
While Griswold, as noted in the Davis and King cases, cannot be cited
as authority for the proposition that certain fundamental, but unnamed
rights, are penumbral to the First Amendment or are guaranteed by the
Ninth, Griswold is authority for the proposition that certain rights, al-
though unnamed, are neverthless protected by the Constitution. Thus, as
stated in Farrell v. Smith :3
It is unnecessary to resolve the much mooted question of whether
this right is 'symbolic speech' . . . or is derived from the Ninth
Amendment of found in the 'penumbra' of other constitutional pro-
tections.
It is sufficient that the right exists and is protected from state
infringement by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.'
Although articulated differently by the Courts in each case, the ma-
jority of those hair decisions which met constitutional issue arrived at this
conclusion. The freedom to determine one's hair style, whether described
as a fundamental right,3 2 or as a "personal liberty 3 was protected by the
Constitution, and the impairment thereof required a "substantial burden
of justification ' ' 3 4 by the state.
A subordinate Constitutional issue, since virtually all petitioners in
these hair cases have been high school and junior high school students, has
been whether, assuming the existence of the right, it is guaranteed to
children as well as to adults.3 5 The Court in Cordova v. Chonko,3 6 citing
"Id. at 428.
2Miller v. Gillis, supra note 7.
"Farrell v. Smith, supra note 9.
-1d. at 736, 737.
12Dunham v. Pulsifier, supra note 9 at 418. 'The nature of the right presented in
the hair cases, although called by many names, has invariably been deemed funda-
mental. ''
3'Finot v. Pasadena City Board of Education, supra note 9. ". . . one of these con-
stitutionally unnamed but protected personal liberties under the due process provisions
of the federal and state constitutions.'' See also, Richard v. Thurston, supra note 9
at 452.34Breen v. Kahl, supra note 9 at 706. It is noteworthy that in one case the right or
liberty was recognized, but the "substantial burden of justification" imposed upon
the state was unequivocally rejected. Pritchard v. Spring Branch Independent School
District, supra note 7. In that case the court traced "preferred place" language
regarding fundamental rights to Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949), wherein Jus-
tice Frankfurter concluded, at 94, "In the field of the First Amendment and Four-
teenth Amendment, insofar as the latter's concept of 'liberty' contains what is
specifically protected by the First, has never commended itself to a majority of this
court. ''
This view was supported in King v. Saddleback Junior College District, supra
note 7 at 428, wherein the court stated that "those asserting the existence of the
right under the particular circumstances, and an impairment thereof, or a threat of
impairment, have the burden of proving it."
'This issue involves only the capacity of children to possess the otherwise admittedly
fundamental right, and should not be confused with the state's disparate power to
regulate it. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 300 U.S. 629 (1968).
36Cordova v. Chonko, supra note 8.
1971]
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Justice Frankfurter from May v. Anderson,37 answered this question with
a rather flat no:
It is obvious that the problem presented by the facts of this case
cannot be solved by reference to cases concerned with the con-
stitutional rights and liberties of adults. Children, of necessity,
cannot be uncritically accorded those rights, and it is foolish to say
they can be.'
But Cordova has standing against it, on this issue, virtually every
other hair decision. Of these, the vast majority simply point to the Su-
preme Court's pronouncement in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School
District.9 Justice Fortas, writing for the majority in Tinker, stated:
In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of totali-
tarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over
their students. Students in school as well as out of school are 'per-
sons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental
rights which the state must respect, just as they themselves must
respect their obligations to the state."0
Thus the settled rule appears to be that laid down by Justice Fortas in
Tinker, that students do not shed their constitutional rights at the school-
house door.41 While other cases have not cited Tinker, they have expressed
agreement therewith through similar assertions. 4 2 Consequently, the rule
that children have constitutional rights which follow them into state-
operated schools is not only well settled, but is one of the few issues, in the
inOraSs presented y hair eases, upon w".idh te is " onsi orl. agree-
ment.
37May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1952). Therein Justice Frankfurter noted "children
have a very special place in life which law should reflect. Legal theories and their
phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious reasoning if uncritically transferred
to determination of a state's duty toward children."
Cordova v. Chonko, supra note 8 at 960.
"Tinker, supra note 21.
1Id. at 511.
"See, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, supra note 9 at 452; Dunham v. Pulsifier, supra note
9 at 417; Farrell v. Smith, supra note 9 at 736; Pritchard v. Spring Branch Inde-
pendent School District, supra note 7 at 574; Westley v. Rossi, supra note 9 at 713;
Reichenberger v. Nelson, supra note 9; Calbillo v. San Jacinto Junior College, supra
note 9; Yoo v. Moynihan, supra note 9; and Crossen v. Fatsi, supra note 9 at 117.
"Miller v. Gillis, supra note 7 at 99. "Students are persons under the Constitution;
they have the same rights and enjoy the" same privileges as adults. Children are not
second class citizens.''
Meyers v. Acata High School District, supra note 9. "Adulthood is not a prerequi-
site: the state and its educational agencies must heed the constitutional rights of
all persons including school boys."
Breen v. Kahl, supra note 9 at 708. "Vigilant protection of constitutional free-
doms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American Schools." (citing
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)]. School Boards have important, delicate,
and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not perform within the
limits of the Bill of Rights. [citing West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)]. To avoid judicial involvement in serious constitutional
issues merely because they concern younger people, in my view, is neither prudent,
expedient, or just.
[Vol. 32
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THE RIGHTS AND REGULATION- THE SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN
OF JUSTIFICATION
The standard against which the hair regulations were to be tested
was laid down in two Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal cases decided on the
same day, Burnside v. Byars4 3 and Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board
of Education,"1, as subsequently affirmed and expanded upon in Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent School District.45
Both Burnside and Blackwell involved regulations which banned the
wearing of "freedom buttons" by students. The Court in Burnside noted
the interest of the state in maintaining an effective system of education,
and that the establishment of such a system required the formulation of
reasonable rules and regulations. As to what was reasonable, they stated:
... a reasonable regulation is one which measurably contributes to
the *maintenance of decorum within the educational system."(Emphasis supplied.)
The court failed to find, from the evidence presented and the record be-
fore it, that the buttons either were calculated to cause, or did in fact cause
a disturbance. Consequently, they held the regulation to be arbitrary, un-
reasonable, and an unnecessary infringement on the student's Constitu-
tional rights.
In Blackwell the factual backdrop was antithetical to that found in
Burnside. The Court found disruption, in fact, and concluded that the
buttons were so inexorably tied to disruption that the two were inseparable.
Consequently, the validity of the regulation was upheld, despite the in-
fringement on petitioner's First Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court, in Tinker, approved the test ennunciated in
Burnside as proper where the constitutional rights of students collide with
school regulations. They also instructed that the State, in justifying such
regulations, must be able to show that its action was caused by something
more than the desire to avoid the discomfort which tends to accompany
an unpopular viewpoint, 47 and that while any expression 48 ".. . in class,
in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of an-
other person may start an argument, or cause a disturbance our Constitu-
tion says that we must take that risk."4 9
Virtually all courts confronted with challenges to school hair regu-
lations have recognized and applied the Burnside test, as refined in
"Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
"Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education, 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
"Tinker, supra note 21.
"Burnside, supra note 43 at 748.
47Tinker, supra note 21 at 509.
"The Supreme Court, in Tinker, used the terms "word spoken", but clearly did not
intend for it to be given its literal translation. In that case they were dealing with
armbands, and therefore symbolic rather than verbal expression.
"Tinker, supra note 21 at 508. See also, Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1959).
1971]
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Tinker.50 Thus, in cases where long hair was found, in fact, to have a dis-
ruptive effect on the successful operation of the educational system, the
interests of the state and the rights of other students prevailed over the
individual student's Constitutional right to maintain the hair length of
his choice. 51 Conversely, where long hair was not found, in fact, to have
a disruptive effect on the educational process, the regulations have been
held violative of due process as unreasonable infringements upon the Con-
stitutional rights of the individual student. 52 The issue revolves around
whether the hair style prohibited contributes measurably to disciplinary
problems in the school.
TheBurnside-Blackwell-Tinker test, as stated above, offers some un-
comfortable grey areas. Thus, what is the status of such regulations when
promulgated as prophylactic measures ?5 This issue is presently unsettled.
While it may seem only reasonable that school officials are not forbidden
to take steps to prevent that which they believe would otherwise result in
a breakdown of school discipline, 54 the weight of authority appears to re-
quire evidence of actual disruption as a condition precedent to the prom-
ulgation of regulations which infringe upon Constitutional rights.55 Tink-
er's prohibition against basing such rules on the "undifferentiated fear
of apprehension of disturbance" 56 would seem to preclude anything short
of requiring such evidence.
5 7
Another potential souce of divergent holdings lies in the determina-
Lion of responsibility for those disruptions which do occur. 8 The recorded
altercations in the hair cases invariably, and logically, emanate not from
5°The most blatant exception was Stevenson v. Wheeler County Board of Education,
supra note 8 at 101, wherein the Court rejected it with the cursory statement that
"these decisions would place an intolerable burden on the Federal Courts to examine
each ease minutely on its facts."
6 Whitsell v. Pampa Independent School District, supra note 9. "A nexus has been
found to exist between rules regulating dress and disruptive influences." See also,
Jackson v. Dorrier, supra note 21 at 216.
52See, e.g., Yoo v. Moynihan, supra note 9 at 815, 816; Calbillo v. San Jacinto Junior
College, supra note 9; Boyle v. Scapple, supra note 9; Bannister v. Paradis, supra
note 7; and Black v. Cothern, supra note 7. In the latter case the Court pointed out
that contra to the facts of Whitsell, there was no evidence that conformity to the
hair regulations would decrease disciplinary problems materially.
"This question presents double-evidentiary difficulties under the present test. First,
since the regulation is preventative by nature, it is not promptd by overt disciplinary
incidents. Second, it is almost impossible to apportion the responsibility for ensuing
disciplinary problems between the act of flaunting the regulation, and the extreme
hair style itself.
"This view is not without support. See, e.g., Davis v. Firment, supra note 8 at 528;
Crossen v. Fatsi, supra note 9 at -118; Carter v. Hodges, supra note 7 at 94; and
Wood v. Almo Heights Independent School District, supra note 7.
"See, e.g., Breen v. Kahl, supra noe 9 at 709; Miller v. Gillis, supra note 7 at 100;
Westley v. Rossi, supra note 9 at 711; Griffin v. Tatum, supra note 9 at 61, 62;
and Cash v. Hoch, supra note 9.
"Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, supra note 21 at 508.
"7Is there a middle ground between "I think it will'" and the "I told you so" other
than the event itself?
"Surprisingly few of the cases to date have directed an inquiry toward rendering such
a determination.
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the long hair itself, but from the reaction of other students, teachers, or
administrators to the long hair. This was emphasized by Judge Tuttle,'
dissenting in Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District:59
It seems to me it cannot be said too often that the constitutional
rights of an individual cannot be denied him because his exercise
of them produces the violent reaction of those who would deprive
him of the very rights he seeks to assert.
These boys were not barred from school because of any actions
carried out by them which were of themselves a disturbance of
the peace. They were barred because it was anticipated, by reason
of previous experiences, that their fellow students in some in-
stances would do things that would disrupt the serenity or calm
of the school. It is these acts which should be prohibited, not the
expressions of individuality by the suspended students. ®
Judge Tuttle's dissent was cited with approval in Westley v. Rossi61 and
Richards v. Thurston. 2
Despite these unresolved problems and the occasional attempts of
Courts to forge their own tests, 63 the standard developed in Burnside,
Blackwell and Tinker has received predominant recognition in the hair
cases. While this test, in the area of personal appearance, has not yet re-
ceived the appoval of the Supreme Court, it has received enough support
in the Federal courts to render safe that grooming regulation which is
promulgated to correct measurable disciplinary problems. The state which
can point to disruptions, in fact, will generally have met the substantial
burden of justification.
THE HAIR REGULATION AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Whether or not the hair regulation denies the male student his rights
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is pres-
"Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School District, supra note 7.
0'Id. at 705, 706.
6Westley v. Rossi, supra note 9 at 712.
"lRichards v. Thurston, supra note 9 at 454.
6Most notable of these are the California cases, Finot v. Pasedena City Board of Edu-
cation, supra note 9, Meyers v. Arcata UnioWv High School District, supra note 9, and
Akin v. Board of Education of Riverside Unified School District, supra note 9, all
of which proceeded under the test devised in Bagley v. Washington Township Hos-
pital District, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401, 421 P.2d 409 (1966), formulated to determine the
permissible limits of restrictions placed upon the political activities of public em-
ployees. Under the Bagley test it was necessary for the state to show: (a) that
the restraint rationally relates to the enhancement of the public service offered, i.e.,
education. (b) that the benefits gained through the restraints outweigh the impair-
ment of the Constitutional right, and (c) that no alternative less subversive of
Constitutional rights is available.
The Bagley test has the appearance of a hybrid between Burnside and O'Brien,
and is more flexible, yet attended by fewer problems than the Burnside-Tinker test,
applied by the Federal Courts. For instance, so long as the Bagley test is otherwise
satisfied, regulations could clearly be of a prophylactic nature.
In addition, the third requirement of the Bagley test is not expressed by the Burn-
side-Tinker test, and while occasionally read into it (as in Griffin v. Tatum, supra
note 9 at 63, where the court held that appropriate disciplinary action could be taken
by school authorities short of having their students' heads shaved), it is generally
not mentioned.
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ently unsettled. It is a manifestly confusing issue in these cases, largely
because both the Burnside test and the traditional equal protection test
speak in terms of reasonableness. Many courts nevertheless have fielded
such challenges.
Under the traditional equal protection test "the classification must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."4 It would
seem that a finding that long hair on male students substantially interferes
with the object of the educational program would end this inquiry, at least
under the traditional test. But such has not been the case among litigated
equal protection-hair regulation challenges.
Some Courts, in upholding the reasonableness of the hair regulation
classifications, have been content to point to the fact that the regulations
were adopted by, or with the aid of, the students themselves. 65 Since the
Equal Protection Clause was adopted to prevent a majority from impos-
ing arbitrary classifications upon a minority, such holdings would appear
to be tenuous at best.
In addition, there have been contentions that hair regulations are un-
reasonable because not enacted by surrounding schools, 66 because not equal-
ly applicable to adults, 67 or because they restrict male, and not female
students.68 One Court, no doubt after an examination of these decisions,
concluded: "This Court simply cannot accept the view that the present
problem can be rationally analyzed in equal protection terms. '"69
Superimposed upon these already confusing equal protection chal-
lenges are those decisions which have held the right of personal grooming
to be fundamental. Where such a view is accepted, the doctrine of equal
protection, as applied to such regulations, requires "strict scrutiny" of
the classification, 70 and a "compelling state interest" to be subserved
"F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). See also, Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 79 (1911).
"See, e.g., Brick v. Board of Education, supra note 9 at 1319; Gfell v. Rickelman, supra
note 6; and Schwartz v. Galveston Independent School District, supra note 7.
"Brick v. Board of Education, supra note 9 at 1321. (The classification was held
reasonable.)
6 Cordova v. Chonko, supra note 8 at 960 (The regulation did not apply to adults,
held reasonable); Breen v. Kahl, supra note 9 at 708 (The regulation did not apply
to adults, held unreasonable) ; Miller v. Gillis, supra note 7 at 101 (The regulation
did not apply to faculty members, held unreasonable).
"Cash v. Hoch, supra note 9 at 347. (No rational basis for the distinction: unreason-
able) ; Livingston v. Swanquist, supra note 7. (Classification reasonable). Interest-
ingly, this Court found their justification for the regulation in this very distinction.
The regulation rendered boys discernible from girls, and thus prevented "some un-
ruly, ill-mannered, or malicious-minded boy" from" sneaking into the girls washroom.
See also, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), (J. Frankfurter concurring).
"Farrell v. Smith, supra note 9 at 737.
70Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
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thereby.71 If, in these hair decisions, the equal protection contention is an
unpopular one, it must be remembered that any determination must also
be made "in light of the special characteristics of the school environ-
ment. "72 Understandably, the cases go both ways.73
THE HAIR REGULATION AND PERMISSIBLE VAGUENESS
Despite the susceptibility of many grooming regulations to vagueness
objections, few have been raised in those hair cases litigated to date.7 4
Where raised, a clear split of authority has developed. Those cases hold-
ing the right to determine one's hair style to be fundamental, have con-
sidered the standards of permissible statutory vagueness to be strict.7 5
Under this line principal what constitutes an extreme fashion or style of
grooming is impermissibly vague. 76
The other line of authority has proceeded from the assumption that
some flexibility in the regulation of student conduct by school adminis-
trators is not only beneficial, but necessary. 77
While vagueness challenges to grooming -regulations present a poten-
tial source of future litigation, it is abundantly clear that such litigation
'Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See also, Cox, Constitutional Adjudication
and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. Rav. 91 (1966) and Developments
in the Law of Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
"Tinker, supra note 21 at 513.
"Those cases holding the hair regulation classifications to be reasonable are Ferrell v.
Dallas Independent School District, supra note 7 at 702; Neuhaus v. Torrey, 38
U.S.L.W. 2517- F. Supp-...(N.D. Cal. 1970); Livingston v. Swanquist, supra
note 7 at 5; and Pritchard v. Spring Branch Independent School, supra note 7 at 579.
Those cases holding the hair regulation classifications to be unreasonable include
Zaehry v. Brown, supra note 7; Dunham v. Pulsifier, supra note 9 at 915; Miller v.
Gillis, supra, note 7 at 101; Alexander v. Thompson, supra note 6; Calbillo v. San
Jacinto Junior College, supra note 9 at 860; and Griffin v. Tatum, supra note 9 at 62.
7
'Such was the case in Westley v. Rossi, supra note 9. There the regulation provided:
"Boys should have neat, conventional male haircuts and be clean shaven." The
Court noted that vagueness and over-breadth had not been urged. The court re-
marked that the terms ''neat'', ''conventional'', and perhaps even ''male", as applied
to "haircuts'', were generic terms having insufficient specificity to comprise a valid
rule of conduct.
Other regulations not challenged for vagueness, but which would appear to have
been questionable, are those involved in Davis v. Firment, supra note 8 at 525 ("Ex-
ceptionally long, shaggy hair and/or exaggerated sideburns shall not be worn");
Black v. Cothern, supra note 7 at 469 ("Any student with accessive long hair, as
determined by the principal. . .''); Carter v. Hodges, supra note 7 at 90 (''Hair of
extrme length or bizarre style will be considered undesirable"); Calbillo v. San
Jacinto Junior College, supra note 9 at 858 ("Male students at San Jacinto College
are required to wear reasonable hair styles and to have no beards or evcessively long
sideburns"); to mention only a few.
In more than one case, the Courts simply held that the petitioners had not, in their
opinion, violated the code. Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School District, supra note 7
at 588 and Olff v. East Side Union High School District, supra note 9 at 559. Such
decisions raise doubts as to the regulation 's specificity. Crossen v. Fatsi, supra note
9 at 118.
"See, e.g., Meyers v. Arcata Union High School District, supra note 9 at 74.
"Crossen v. Fatsi, supra note 9 at 117, 118.
"Pritchard v. Spring Branch Independent School District, sipra note 7 at 519. See also,
Giangreco v. Center School District, supra note 6; and Jackson v. Dorrier, supra note 7.
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is avoidable. The regulation which is vulnerable to vagueness objections
is that which speaks in terms of "extremes of hair styles," "long hair,"
and "neatness." Conversely, those which provide that hair should not
protrude over the eyes, ears or collars78 offer a standard which informs
the average student of what is and is not permissible under the regulation.
CONCLUSION
Since the interest of the state in maintaining an orderly educational
system is clearly compelling,79 it is settled that the state, through its schools,
may promulgate and enforce regulations directed toward that end. The
question of whether it can regulate and dictate the hair length of its stu-
dents, however, is unsettled. The answer will ultimately depend upon
whether the student's right to determine his hair style is deemed funda-
mental, and if so, how much school disruption the Courts will require as
justification for restriction of the right. In addition, there still exists the
possibility that such regulations violate the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, a view suggested by Supreme Court Justice
Douglas, 0 and that such regulations will fall to vagueness determinations.
While this writer would urge that hair regulations bear no rational rela-
tionship to the objects of education, he has read over fifty cases in which
someone thought they did. Ironically, fifty cases later, the question of
hair and the school regulation is still open.
JAMES D. MOORE
78See, e.g., Breen v. Kahl, supra note 9 at 703 and Brick v. Board of Education, supra
note 9 at 1318.
'-Burnside v. Byars, upra note 43 at 748.
'OFerrell v. Dallas Independent School District, supra note 1.
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